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Can we be morally good without God?

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Can we be morally good without God?
Tisthammerw
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Posted 12/07/08 - 09:20 PM:
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#11
Kwalish Kid wrote:
The argument, as one should be able to see, is a presentation of Divine Command theory. Despite protestations of the author, protestations of Lady Macbeth character, the theory is nothing more that Divine Command and can be seen as such as the author continues to stick to the language of authority despite the many criticisms on this score.

As I said earlier, whether it is divine command theory will depend on how you define the term. If you define it as "what is morally right and wrong flows solely from God’s commands, and that there is no deeper underlying foundation for morality" then no. I believe there is a deeper underlying reason: God's perfectly good nature, which constitutes what Plato called The Good (the ideal or perfect nature of goodness, and so an absolute measure of justice) from which God's commands necessarily flow from. Still, you can define divine command theory broadly enough to include this (as William Lane Craig does) and so in that sense I can be considered an adherent of divine command theory.


Kwalish Kid wrote:
Suppose for instance the answer to this question is "nothing." Unless one is an adherent of moral nihilism (which says there is nothing morally wrong) this encounters problems. If there is literally nothing that says how we ought to behave, then there is also nothing that says Hitler ought to have behaved differently when he decided to slaughter millions of Jews.

Again, here the author actually asks for a recourse to some commander, someone to state that a certain act is good or bad. And, of course, like any bad rhetorician these days, makes an emotional appeal to the Holocaust.

There is a significant difference between, "There is no being that makes statements about how one should behave," and, "There is no basis for morality."

You're right, but you kind of insinuated a straw man here. I'm sure you recall that the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave" is looking for the basis of morality, but recall also I asked who or what says how we ought to behave. The question was not limiting the answers to beings, as you implied here.


Kwalish Kid wrote:
So we're back to the question at hand for the atheist. If God does not exist and moral principles are binding independently of whether we believe them to be so, who or what says how we ought to behave?

So we're left with, unsurprisingly, the argument from ignorance. The author cannot think of (and actively ignores) arguments for a basis for morality that do not involve the very bizarre definition of God he provides. Given the vast amount of literature on this topic, this wilful ignorance places the author in the position of either one of two conditions. The first condition is that of being so incompetent as to be beneath consideration. The second condition is that of being completely dishonest and using rhetoric in order to draw in those who have difficulty following an argument.

Yes, it could be I'm "so incompetent" and "completely dishonest." Or it just might be I was genuinely asking a question here. If God does not exist and moral principles are binding independently of whether we believe them to be so, who or what says how we ought to behave? You yourself chose to respond with personal attacks rather than answer the question.


Kwalish Kid wrote:
Interestingly enough, it seems almost self-evident to both the theist and the atheistic moral objectivist that objective morality is a fundamental part of reality. In the case of classical theism, God is the fundamental reality from which all existence and moral truths originate. Atheism faces a bit of a challenge however. Since moral statements are not analytic (true by definition, e.g. "hairless men have no hair"), it's more difficult for atheism to explain why morality exists so fundamentally, because in that case what would be morality's metaphysical basis? Let X be the basis of objective morality. X does not seem to be confined to any particular time or location. If we cut out any tiny space-time segment of the universe and destroyed the rest, morality would still exist in that segment.

Again an argument from ignorance. Many theorists claim that the basis for morality is very confined to a particular time and location because without sentient or feeling beings, there is no morality of any kind.

(1) Thought experiments aren't the same thing as arguments from ignorance; I thus find your accusation rather strange here. (2) I specifically reply to that rebuttal in my post, which we'll get to next:

Kwalish Kid wrote:
What about humans? One interesting idea is that it is the existence of humans that somehow causes moral truths to exist, and if we took away humans moral truths would not exist. Upon closer examination however this does not appear to be the case. Take for instance the necessarily true statement "all bachelors are unmarried." This claim would hold true even if there were no bachelors, because what the statement is essentially saying is, "If there was one or more bachelors, any such bachelor would be unmarried." Similarly, the moral statement "It is morally wrong for a man to torture an infant just for fun" essentially means "If there was a man and an infant, the man should not torture the infant just for fun." Would this if-statement hold true in a universe without humans? It would appear so, because if we started with a universe without humans and the if-statement wasn't true, then even if we inserted a man and an infant into this previously uninhabited universe the statement "the man should not torture the infant just for fun" would not be true. This would mean "It is morally wrong for a man to torture an infant just for fun" is true without humans in the same way that "all bachelors are unmarried" is true without bachelors. But if that is the case, then the basis of objective moral truths cannot be the existence of humans.

There is an obvious problem with this argument: the author asks us to believe that counterfactual hypothetical statements that involve humans do not involve an understanding of what a human being is.

I do not say or imply any such thing. You've inadvertently created a straw man here.


Kwalish Kid wrote:
The basis of morality would have a number of other interesting characteristics as well. Whoever or whatever it is that says how we ought to behave, this X must possess the following attributes.

  • Supremely transcendent authority. It is one thing to merely say what people should do, but X (the basis of objective morality) must be authoritative in that people really ought to obey it. Suppose for instance a Nazi commands a subordinate to kill Jews. Is it the case that the subordinate ought to obey the Nazi? No, the subordinate ought to obey the dictates of morality instead, because the dictates of objective morality ought to be obeyed over the orders of any human. The basis of morality must transcend the authority of other people's behavioral commands if its ought-statements are to be objectively truthful. This would include, for instance, transcending the authority of dictators who would order torture and genocide. Otherwise people ought to obey the dictator instead of morality. So the basis of objective morality not only says how we ought to behave but also does so with supremely transcendent authority (transcending e.g. Hitler's authority).

  • Again the author retreats to command theory rather than actually consider some other sort of statements. Note that there is no reason for the author to say that it is wrong for people to obey a dictator.

    Except of course the obvious one: the dictates of morality trump that of any human. What "other sort of statements" are you referring to? Morality as I defined it consists of ought-statements, e.g. "one ought not to steal." I should note that you didn't actually refute the claim here. The basis of morality still requires supreme authority. Whatever entity or force lays down moral obligations, we ought to obey it.


    Kwalish Kid wrote:
  • Universally binding. Goes along with the nature of objective morality. X's authority must be universally binding in that it applies to everyone (e.g. all peoples in all governments) regardless of who, when, and where we are and regardless of what any human thinks, feels, and believes.

  • Again, there is no reason to suppose that this is a requirement.

    Except for the one I just described. Morality applies to everyone; that's what I mean by universally binding. Morality is binding to all humans.


    Kwalish Kid wrote:
  • Infallibly authoritative. The basis of objective morality cannot be mistaken on what is morally right (else it would not be the basis of morality when it says what is moral), so it says how we ought to behave with infallible moral authority.

  • This brings us to the standard problem of all divine command theories. There is no reason, except for the trivial one, to say that the source of morality is actually moral. The being could be entirely without thought and would still be, technically, infallible.

    True, the above quote does not by itself imply that the basis of morality is a thinking being. But it was never meant to. Remember, I very specifically said who or what says how we ought to behave and used the example of mathematics (which is not a sentient being obviously) to illustrate what I meant.


    Kwalish Kid wrote:
    The existence of God would provide the foundation for objective morality as the eternal sovereign entity that everyone ought to obey. The problem for the atheistic moral objectivist would be trying to find a reasonable basis for objective morality that fits the above characteristics (e.g. eternal and omnipresent while being the supreme authority in the universe) but cannot reasonably be called God.

    Of course, the atheist and theist could more correctly reject the abysmally poor arguments above and simply move on with being moral.

    Personal attacks, straw man and strange accusations aside, there's still a problem you haven't addressed. If God does not exist and moral principles are binding independently of whether we believe them to be so, who or what says how we ought to behave? You also still have the problem of finding a basis that fits all the characteristics I mentioned (eternal, omnipresent, infallible and supreme authority etc.).

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    Wosret
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    Posted 12/07/08 - 09:22 PM:
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    #12
    Tisthammerw wrote:

    So you say, but can you think of an alternative, one that you're willing to accept? If morality exists without God, who or what says how we ought to behave?


    Nothing. Nothing objective demands that I favor truth over lies, reason over unreason, or to get out of bed in the morning. This depends on my aims and goals. Once I accept certain drives, motivations, goals and aims however, much follows.


    OK, now please answer some questions I asked earlier.


    Justify it in the context you used it in, not completely different contexts. I will not respond to other contexts, it is a waste of time.


    You said, "I reject the soundness, not the validity," but you yourself said that the Holocaust is morally wrong. You therefore believe the argument is sound.


    Then the argument completely fails to demonstrate objective morals, which is what I thought you were trying to do.


    When it comes to finishing the sentence "X is immoral if (the culture believes it? the individual believes it?)..." your answer is still a little vague.


    How do you interpret "In this sense, there can be moral facts. Facts that are not dependent on any one individual, or any culture, and can be demonstrated with reason and evidence to anyone." as being too vague to answer that question?


    What "evidence" are you talking about? We cannot empirically test for the immorality of stealing, for instance.


    Foundations are not equivalent to propositions. These need to be separated. Moral foundations are innate in our brains. Founded in empathy, and a sense of fairness and justice. Moral specifics can be taken as propositional. If you say that it is immoral to steal, then we can evaluate this, and find out that if this is generally so based on our sense of justice fairness and empathy.

    Void of context you are stuck with dilemmas that make a mockery of the assertion. If it were true that "it is immoral to steal" then it would be immoral to steal the antidote to save the lives of a population from the psychopath that poisoned them.

    I think that it is obvious that you cannot assert that a moral proposition is true void of context. That needs to be evaluated.


    It is true we can test for the "benefit to harm ratio" at least if we define "benefit" as "pleasure and happiness" and harm as "pain and misery." Is that what you mean? It's almost as if you're saying "the principle that we ought to maximize benefit and minimize harm [using the same definitions of "benefit" and "harm" I mentioned earlier] says how we ought to behave." Is this what you mean?


    No, nothing says that we ought do anything. We all have goals and aims that may motivate us to do things, and then we can work from those, but nothing says that you ought to do anything. Is ought fallacy.


    Whether it's absurd depends on how you define "objective moral opinions." I'm not sure what you mean by that, and thus I'm also not sure why what you're saying would make "moral principles are valid, binding, and true independently of whether any of us humans think, feel, or believe them to be so" a false belief. Perhaps you could elucidate here?


    I already have. You are trying to allow morality to be the product of an agent, but not a human agent, so you must strictly adhere to a nonsensical definition of objective that makes all non-human opinions objective. So humans are then the only moral agents that don't have objective moral opinions. You don't see anything wrong with that?


    Could you please clearly explain why your brand of moral subjectivism doesn't fit the category of objective morality as I defined it? I'm not yet convinced you're really describing another alternative. So far, it still sounds like a form of objective morality.


    It does fit moral objectivism how you have defined it, because I know that humans are not the only moral agents, thus because other social mammals have moral opinions, under your definition of objective their opinions are objective because they are non-human. This is of course absurd, so I reject your definition of objective.


    This is precisely my point. If the Nazis succeeded in exterminating or brainwashing everyone who disagreed with them, they would still be wrong even if they thought otherwise, right? Wouldn't this imply that moral principles are valid, true, and binding independently of whether we believe them to be so?


    This completely ignores what I wrote next "They were mislead with propaganda and lies. Anyone can be lead to false conclusions based on false information. The problem is that when it is a moral issue, the significance is much greater. The consequences, much more severe. This is not an example of an equally grounded differing of opinions. It stands to reason that any sane Nazi that was presented with accurate information, would have reached far different conclusions."

    All that is implied is that they were mislead by propaganda and lies.


    Perhaps you mean their core beliefs (e.g. don't kill innocent people) weren't different and they were just ignorant that they were violating this principle. I'm not sure how plausible this is, at least with those Nazis who deliberately killed women and children, but let's ignore that for the moment.


    That is complete nonsense. Do you deny that there was a massive and deliberate campaign of distortions and lies about the Jews? Or do you think that they were fed accurate information? Do you think that it is likely that you will reach a correct conclusion if your information is distortions and lies? You think that it is plausible that they were not mislead? Or that somehow the correct conclusions would still be easily forthcoming from false information? Care to name another area where this would be the case?


    Suppose a group of men called the Syndicate really did know they were killing innocent people solely for selfish gains (wealth, power) but believed there was nothing morally wrong with what they were doing (it could plausibly have happened before at last once; moral nihilists do exist).


    Sigh... I dislike arguing against someone's ad hoc hypotheticals.


    Suppose the Syndicate succeeded in killing or brainwashing everyone who disagreed with them. Would the Syndicate be morally right here? Or would moral principles are valid, true, and binding independently of whether they believe them to be so?


    "Moral principles are valid true and binding" holds no information value void of context.

    Let me ask you: do you think that it is moral to kill one innocent person to save all of humanity? If you think that without context a moral principle is "killing the innocent is wrong" then you can't say yes to this question. If you do however, then you do not accept that "moral principles are true valid and binding" is meaningful void of context.

    Edited by Wosret on 12/07/08 - 09:28 PM

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    Tisthammerw
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    Posted 12/07/08 - 09:29 PM:
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    #13
    makerowner wrote:
    The answer to the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" need not be a literal mouth and voice or even necessarily anything that communicates to humanity. Rather, "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" is simply asking for the foundation of morality and the source of moral principles; i.e. the entity/thing/force that lays down these moral obligations and prohibitions.

    That brings up the epistemological question of how we come to know these moral principles, and how we should find out which ones are founded.

    I'm not actually going to address this because it's going off topic. I'm arguing about moral ontology (what is the foundation of morality?) not moral epistemology (how do we know what is moral?). You've presented good and valid questions, but they're not what this thread is about (sorry).


    makerowner wrote:
    The problem with "nothing says how we ought to behave" is that it is tantamount to saying "there are no rules of behavior." Something has to say how we ought to behave, whether it be God, mathematics or whatever.

    Why can't that something be us?

    This is a good question. My response is that this would lead to absurdities. Cultural relativism says "the culture says how we ought to behave." Ethical subjectivism says "the individual says how we ought to behave." Cultural relativism says being violently anti-Semitic is morally right if that's what one's culture believes. Ethical subjectivism says an individual trying to exterminate the Jews is morally right if that's what the individual believes. None of these alternatives seem even remotely plausible.


    makerowner wrote:
    Since moral statements are not analytic (true by definition, e.g. "hairless men have no hair")

    There are plenty of problems with the term 'analytic', but I see even more with your use of the term 'moral statement'. What is a moral statement? Is any statement with the predicate "is right" or "is wrong" a moral statement? Clearly that won't work, since those terms can also mean 'correct' and 'incorrect', or 'suitable' and 'unsuitable'.

    Basically, they refer to principles concerning how one should and should not behave. I hope this answers your question.

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    kNoctis
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    Posted 12/07/08 - 09:49 PM:
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    #14
    Tisthammerw wrote:


    ...you forgot to add that the Great Snowman must also have aseity


    Can you explain to me why this is the case? Or, point me to your post if I might have missed it.

    Tisthammerw wrote:
    Can we not reasonably call this eternal and omnipresent sovereign entity God?


    Absolutely not. At least, not on the basis of this argument alone. That is what I was trying to say. The term "God" is traditionally and commonly defined as something much more than the characteristics that your argument requires to exist.



    Tisthammerw wrote:
    The problem with "nothing says how we ought to behave" is that it is tantamount to saying "there are no rules of behavior." Something has to say how we ought to behave, whether it be God, mathematics or whatever.


    I will again repeat myself...
    kNoctis wrote:
    ...you have failed to provide any real evidence for [the proposition that 'something has to say how we ought to behave'], other than its falsification being undesirable. A world such as that would be a consequence of finding no basis in morality, but it doesn't mean there must be one.


    Not only that, but it's not the case that "something has to say how we ought to behave", since the term 'say' implies a personal entity and there are at least a handful of reasons we should reject a personal entity as being a basis for morality - not the least of which, and which I have mentioned, and you have ignored numerous times, a personal basis for morality gets tangled up in the Euthryphro.

    tisthammerw wrote:
    God is classically an incorporeal entity, yet He is said to be eternal and omnipresent. I don't think this is necessarily unreasonable


    I do.

    tisthammerw wrote:
    because it could be true in a more nonphysical sense.


    I'm listening.

    tisthammerw wrote:
    More abstractly, the truth of "2 + 2 = 4" exists in all places in all times; there is no place or time where it doesn't hold true.


    ...and if God exists, then the truth of 'God exists' exists in all places and in all times. But to say the truth of 'God exists' exists, and to say 'God exists' are two separate things. Although the truth of '2+2=4' exists in all places and all times, '2+2=4' itself doesn't. When someone claims God is omnipresent, they intend to convey more than merely claiming 'the true proposition that God is omnipresent' exists in all places and all times'. They mean to say God himself does, which doesn't translate into the same thing.

    tisthammerw wrote:
    I kind of answered that in my original posts. Cut out any tiny space-time segment of the universe and destroy the rest; would the moral statement "one should not torture infants just for fun" still be true in that segment?


    If no moral agents, i.e. no modern humans existed, then the statement 'one should not tortue infants just for fun' would be meaningless. It would be neither true nor false, and therefore a foundation for morality would not be necessary.

    tisthammerw wrote:
    It would appear so. It would appear to be true at all times in the universe's existence. What about moral agents? If we remove moral agents (e.g. humans), would moral truths cease to exist? I don't think it would, and here's why.
    Take for instance the necessarily true statement "all bachelors are unmarried." This claim would hold true even if there were no bachelors, because what the statement is essentially saying is, "If there was one or more bachelors, any such bachelor would be unmarried."


    Again, your analogy is inaccurate. Analytic statements of this kind require no empirical setting in order to be properly evaluated. All bachelors are unmarried regardless of how many bachelors we're talking about, how close they've ever been to being married, the circumstances for why they never tied the knot, etc... The terms have been defined and all cases, no matter how far off they seem, will adhere to those rules.

    However, moral agents must exist in order for moral statements to be true or false, because actions can't be morally evaluated apart from the contexts and circumstances in which they occur. You can say, for instance, 'abortion is wrong', or 'murder is wrong', or even 'tortuing infants is wrong', but the consequences and intentions of our actions play a large part in determining their moral status, and intentions and consequences differ to the extent that they are never the same. Some actions are more consistent with respect to intentions and consequences, and therefore, provide a more consistent application of a particular moral rule, such as tortuing infants. However, others are wildly diverse.

    tisthammerw wrote:
    if we started with a universe without humans and the if-statement wasn't true, then even if we inserted a man and an infant into this previously uninhabited universe the statement "the man should not torture the infant just for fun" would not be true.


    Without moral agents, it isn't that these statements aren't true, it's that they are meaningless. It would be like asking someone the score of the football game, despite the fact that there was no football game played.

    tisthammerw wrote:
    Perhaps not, but that has no relevance as to whether slavery was morally wrong.


    Could that man be held morally culpable for owning slaves? If not, then how can we say that slavery was unethical?

    tisthammerw wrote:
    Why? Modern forms of the Euthyhphro dilemma argue that if God were the basis of morality, then morality would be arbitrary in the sense that God could have commanded anything, even rape, and rape would become ethical. Presumably, rape cannot possibly ethical, and therefore God isn't the basis of morality. But there's a problem. If rape cannot possibly ethical, then it cannot be possible for the basis of morality (whatever that might be) to command rape. We would have to reason that the basis of morality has some type of immutable nature such that it could not command rape. But why think that God cannot have that nature? So far, I haven't seen an explanation for that.


    Why do you keep bringing this up? No one is making that argument. I introduced the Euthyphro to show a contradiction between what we normally think of as moral rules, and what moral rules would entail if God were the basis of morality. It has nothing to do with whether or not they are arbitrary. It has to do with whether or not they are binding.

    If God is the basis of morality, then morality is nothing more than a series of commands, which means that there is no moral impetus to follow them. In the same token, (which I've already discussed), if a bully tells you not to cross his side of the room, it might be a good idea to listen to him, but that doesn't mean it is immoral not to do so.

    Your response to this was "the bully is not the basis of morality", but from my perspective, since you haven't provided any actual reasons for me to accept your argument, neither is God.

    I've asked you for a reason why we should obey God's authority on moral grounds, and your response is because 'that is how I am defining him'. Ok. I have a brute definition of my own. We should follow moral rules, because this is how I am defining them. God is not necessary.

    Edited by kNoctis on 12/07/08 - 09:57 PM. Reason: quote brackets
    Tisthammerw
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    Posted 12/07/08 - 09:57 PM:
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    #15
    Wosret wrote:
    So you say, but can you think of an alternative, one that you're willing to accept? If morality exists without God, who or what says how we ought to behave?

    Nothing. Nothing objective demands that I favor truth over lies, reason over unreason, or to get out of bed in the morning. This depends on my aims and goals. Once I accept certain drives, motivations, goals and aims however, much follows.

    Unfortunately this still doesn't quite answer my question. Are you saying our goals say how we ought to behave? What if my goal is to exterminate millions of Jews? Would it then become moral?


    Wosret wrote:
    You said, "I reject the soundness, not the validity," but you yourself said that the Holocaust is morally wrong. You therefore believe the argument is sound.

    Then the argument completely fails to demonstrate objective morals, which is what I thought you were trying to do.

    No, I wasn't trying to do any such thing in the argument you're referring to. The conclusion was rather specifically "moral nihilism is false" not "objective morals exist." Apparently however, there was some confusion as to what "moral nihilism" meant.


    Wosret wrote:
    When it comes to finishing the sentence "X is immoral if (the culture believes it? the individual believes it?)..." your answer is still a little vague.

    How do you interpret "In this sense, there can be moral facts. Facts that are not dependent on any one individual, or any culture, and can be demonstrated with reason and evidence to anyone." as being too vague to answer that question?

    That response does not specify what this "evidence" might consist of, or how reason could interact with said evidence to produce moral principles.


    Wosret wrote:
    What "evidence" are you talking about? We cannot empirically test for the immorality of stealing, for instance.

    Foundations are not equivalent to propositions. These need to be separated. Moral foundations are innate in our brains. Founded in empathy, and a sense of fairness and justice. Moral specifics can be taken as propositional. If you say that it is immoral to steal, then we can evaluate this, and find out that if this is generally so based on our sense of justice fairness and empathy.

    But suppose I am a sociopath and have no sense of justice or empathy. Suppose I kill or brainwash everyone who is not like me in this way. Would moral principles still exist?


    Wosret wrote:
    It is true we can test for the "benefit to harm ratio" at least if we define "benefit" as "pleasure and happiness" and harm as "pain and misery." Is that what you mean? It's almost as if you're saying "the principle that we ought to maximize benefit and minimize harm [using the same definitions of "benefit" and "harm" I mentioned earlier] says how we ought to behave." Is this what you mean?

    No, nothing says that we ought do anything. We all have goals and aims that may motivate us to do things, and then we can work from those, but nothing says that you ought to do anything.

    If that were literally true, then there is also nothing that says Hitler ought to have behaved differently when he decided to slaughter millions of Jews. Remember, I'm not looking for a literal mouth and voice here or even necessarily anything that communicates to humanity; just the foundation of morality and the source of moral principles.


    Wosret wrote:
    Whether it's absurd depends on how you define "objective moral opinions." I'm not sure what you mean by that, and thus I'm also not sure why what you're saying would make "moral principles are valid, binding, and true independently of whether any of us humans think, feel, or believe them to be so" a false belief. Perhaps you could elucidate here?

    I already have. You are trying to allow morality to be the product of an agent, but not a human agent, so you must strictly adhere to a nonsensical definition of objective that makes all non-human opinions objective. So humans are then the only moral agents that don't have objective moral opinions. You don't see anything wrong with that?

    OK, so you're defining "objective moral opinions" as "non-human opinions." I still don't see how any of this would make "moral principles are valid, binding, and true independently of whether any of us humans think, feel, or believe them to be so" a false belief. So far this looks more like quibbling over definienda rather than whether the described belief (the type of morality I just described) is actually absurd or false.


    Wosret wrote:
    This is precisely my point. If the Nazis succeeded in exterminating or brainwashing everyone who disagreed with them, they would still be wrong even if they thought otherwise, right? Wouldn't this imply that moral principles are valid, true, and binding independently of whether we believe them to be so?

    This completely ignores what I wrote next "They were mislead with propaganda and lies. Anyone can be lead to false conclusions based on false information. The problem is that when it is a moral issue, the significance is much greater. The consequences, much more severe. This is not an example of an equally grounded differing of opinions. It stands to reason that any sane Nazi that was presented with accurate information, would have reached far different conclusions."

    (1) I kind of addressed this in what I wrote after that; (2) you still didn't answer my questions.


    Wosret wrote:
    Perhaps you mean their core beliefs (e.g. don't kill innocent people) weren't different and they were just ignorant that they were violating this principle. I'm not sure how plausible this is, at least with those Nazis who deliberately killed women and children, but let's ignore that for the moment.

    That is complete nonsense. Do you deny that there was a massive and deliberate campaign of distortions and lies about the Jews?

    No. Do you deny there were Nazis who deliberately killed women and children? For some people perhaps it's plausible they didn't know they were violating their core beliefs (e.g. don't kill innocent people) because they were told Jews were behind bad things happening in Germany. I'm not sure how plausible this is in all cases however, at least with those Nazis who deliberately killed women and children.


    Wosret wrote:
    Suppose a group of men called the Syndicate really did know they were killing innocent people solely for selfish gains (wealth, power) but believed there was nothing morally wrong with what they were doing (it could plausibly have happened before at last once; moral nihilists do exist).

    Sigh... I dislike arguing against someone's ad hoc hypotheticals.
    Suppose the Syndicate succeeded in killing or brainwashing everyone who disagreed with them. Would the Syndicate be morally right here? Or would moral principles are valid, true, and binding independently of whether they believe them to be so?

    "Moral principles are valid true and binding" holds no information value void of context.

    Great, but that doesn't answer my question at all. The statement you quoted doesn't say moral principles can't be applied differently depending on the context (e.g. when moral principles conflict, as in the hypothetical case of where one needs kill one innocent person to save all of humanity).

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    Kwalish Kid
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    Posted 12/07/08 - 10:33 PM:
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    #16
    Tisthammerw wrote:
    As I said earlier, whether it is divine command theory will depend on how you define the term. If you define it as "what is morally right and wrong flows solely from God’s commands, and that there is no deeper underlying foundation for morality" then no. I believe there is a deeper underlying reason: God's perfectly good nature, which constitutes what Plato called The Good (the ideal or perfect nature of goodness, and so an absolute measure of justice) from which God's commands necessarily flow from. Still, you can define divine command theory broadly enough to include this (as William Lane Craig does) and so in that sense I can be considered an adherent of divine command theory.

    But you aren't making any Platonic argument. As any number of people have pointed out, there is absolutely no reason to identify your God with anything like Plato's good. Your God and your morality are entirely arbitrary.
    You're right, but you kind of insinuated a straw man here. I'm sure you recall that the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave" is looking for the basis of morality, but recall also I asked who or what says how we ought to behave. The question was not limiting the answers to beings, as you implied here.

    There is no straw man. You really do limit your question to beings again and again and again. This is one of the many failings of your argument.
    Yes, it could be I'm "so incompetent" and "completely dishonest." Or it just might be I was genuinely asking a question here.

    Actually, no. You are either incompetent or dishonest (or both). If you were genuinely interested, you would show some signs of actually having read something on the subject. So either you have not or you have and you are concealing the facts from your readers. Either case is, frankly, pathetic.
    If God does not exist and moral principles are binding independently of whether we believe them to be so, who or what says how we ought to behave? You yourself chose to respond with personal attacks rather than answer the question.

    Yes, I responded with attacks because your behaviour is insulting.
    (1) Thought experiments aren't the same thing as arguments from ignorance; I thus find your accusation rather strange here.

    That you avoid discussing a central tenet of contemporary moral theory that is a clear response to your thought experiment consists in the argument from ignorance.
    I do not say or imply any such thing. You've inadvertently created a straw man here.

    No, I am simply reporting what is required for your argument to succeed. That you cannot see this is yet another sign of your incompetence or dishonesty.

    You wish to say that morality is independent of the nature of humans because we can imagine that statements about morality would be true is no humans existed. Yet your example is one where we could understand the nature of hypothetical humans and thus judge the truth of the claim. Only by begging the question can your example work.
    Except of course the obvious one: the dictates of morality trump that of any human. What "other sort of statements" are you referring to? Morality as I defined it consists of ought-statements, e.g. "one ought not to steal." I should note that you didn't actually refute the claim here. The basis of morality still requires supreme authority. Whatever entity or force lays down moral obligations, we ought to obey it.

    Except that we have no reason to believe that "one should obey dictators without questions" is not a true moral statement. If it is a true moral statement, then it cannot be used as a counter-example in your argument.
    Except for the one I just described. Morality applies to everyone; that's what I mean by universally binding. Morality is binding to all humans.

    But you're just saying that. Nobody has any reason to believe you. You seem to have some problem understanding that simply because you say something, that doesn't mean that it's true. Indeed, given your track record, if you were to say something, it would be fair to assume that it was false.
    True, the above quote does not by itself imply that the basis of morality is a thinking being. But it was never meant to. Remember, I very specifically said who or what says how we ought to behave and used the example of mathematics (which is not a sentient being obviously) to illustrate what I meant.

    You did use the example, but you never learned the lessons. You keep referring to Plato's idea of The Good without realizing that it bears no relation to your God. You keep saying that God would not command rape. Yet, your God can be as arbitrary and specific as we can imagine in its providing warrant to moral claims. When there is serious consideration to be done, you duck out with a remark about some commander.
    Personal attacks, straw man and strange accusations aside, there's still a problem you haven't addressed. If God does not exist and moral principles are binding independently of whether we believe them to be so, who or what says how we ought to behave? You also still have the problem of finding a basis that fits all the characteristics I mentioned (eternal, omnipresent, infallible and supreme authority etc.).

    Well, since there is no reason to believe in your characteristics, I feel just fine. I will continue to be moral because I actually care about people. You, I suspect, will be moral by accident until some church leader says something that, correctly interpreted or not, encourages you to seriously hurt someone. At that point you will commit the immoral act or you will wise up and perhaps start actually engaging with moral reasoning.

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    Posted 12/07/08 - 10:40 PM:
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    #17
    Tisthammerw wrote:
    Nothing. Nothing objective demands that I favor truth over lies, reason over unreason, or to get out of bed in the morning. This depends on my aims and goals. Once I accept certain drives, motivations, goals and aims however, much follows.

    Unfortunately this still doesn't quite answer my question. Are you saying our goals say how we ought to behave? What if my goal is to exterminate millions of Jews? Would it then become moral?

    Of course it doesn't answer your question. That's because you do not really think of Jews as people. You don't think of anyone as people. You're looking for orders like the Nazis gave out: direct and with a clear sense of authority. You are considering individual orders rather than the idea that actual thinking things have aims and goals. This failure is the profound failure of many totalitarian states throughout history. It is a failure addressed again and again in the literature of those actually concerned with morality. It is a failure pursued with zealotry by those who want to impose their will and the will they imagine for God on their fellow citizens.

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    Wosret
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    Posted 12/07/08 - 11:11 PM:
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    #18
    Tisthammerw wrote:


    Unfortunately this still doesn't quite answer my question. Are you saying our goals say how we ought to behave? What if my goal is to exterminate millions of Jews? Would it then become moral?


    Of course not. There is nothing that says that we ought to act moral. If you chose to act immoral, then you can do that, which is demonstrate time and time again by many people. Whether you chose to act rationally or irrational has no baring on what is in fact rational and irrational. If you chose to favor lies over truth, it doesn't affect what is a lie and what is true.


    No, I wasn't trying to do any such thing in the argument you're referring to. The conclusion was rather specifically "moral nihilism is false" not "objective morals exist." Apparently however, there was some confusion as to what "moral nihilism" meant.


    Moral nihilism is that there are no objective morals. What you linked to claims that J. L. Mackie argued that nothing was morally wrong. This is false. He claimed that nothing was objectively morally wrong. This is what his arguments focused on. Mackie personally claims that his position is not significantly different from moral subjectivism, and that he does not deny that things are morally wrong in the sense that I think that they are. He denies that there are categorical imperatives to morality. Whoever wrote that entry response to Mackie was straw-manning his position. I suggest that you read his "Ethics: Inventing right and wrong" to get his actual position on this, and would suggest that you refrain from using that website for information in the future, as it is clearly not a reliable source.


    That response does not specify what this "evidence" might consist of, or how reason could interact with said evidence to produce moral principles.


    We can make generalized principles based on normative conclusions of the more obvious examples of violations of fairness, justice, and causes of harm, and then make room for appeal in the case of special cases. Much as the court system is based on.


    But suppose I am a sociopath and have no sense of justice or empathy. Suppose I kill or brainwash everyone who is not like me in this way. Would moral principles still exist?


    In what sense? As in would it still be true that A was unjust, or that X results in more harm than good? Then yes, of course.


    If that were literally true, then there is also nothing that says Hitler ought to have behaved differently when he decided to slaughter millions of Jews. Remember, I'm not looking for a literal mouth and voice here or even necessarily anything that communicates to humanity; just the foundation of morality and the source of moral principles.


    That is correct. There is no categorical imperative for anyone to behave in anyway. Unless you would like to identify it. Not just moral imperatives either. Can you identify a categorical imperative to favor truth over lies, or reason over unreason? I would be very interested if you could.


    OK, so you're defining "objective moral opinions" as "non-human opinions."


    I'm not, you are.


    I still don't see how any of this would make "moral principles are valid, binding, and true independently of whether any of us humans think, feel, or believe them to be so" a false belief. So far this looks more like quibbling over definienda rather than whether the described belief (the type of morality I just described) is actually absurd or false.


    Simple. Do you think that morality is independent of what your purported god thinks and feels? If not, then thoughts and feelings are not the important subject in your definition, but "human" is. This is what I fundamentally disagree with. The objective is true independent of any agent's thoughts or feelings, not just human thoughts and feelings.


    (1) I kind of addressed this in what I wrote after that; (2) you still didn't answer my questions.


    I answered the damn question several times now. You keep asking it again and again. I don't know what you're trying to achieve by doing that.


    Great, but that doesn't answer my question at all. The statement you quoted doesn't say moral principles can't be applied differently depending on the context (e.g. when moral principles conflict, as in the hypothetical case of where one needs kill one innocent person to save all of humanity).


    Saying that they are true void of context is meaningless, and since we need context to evaluate them, do you deny that the standard we use to judge their morality is the situations, and events, and not some abstract metaphysical command?

    How can you otherwise justify the need for the commands if the morality of an action is context dependent, and requires evaluation?

    Edited by Wosret on 12/08/08 - 02:09 AM

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    Posted 12/07/08 - 11:17 PM:
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    #19
    It might be worth pointing to the poverty of the systematic method adopted by Tis.

    Let's start by looking at definitions. It might seem a good idea to "first define our terms"; but I think this approach shows a fundamental misunderstanding about how language works.

    From Wikipedia, we find"A definition may either describe the meaning that a term bears in general use, providing a descriptive definition, or that which the speaker intends to impose upon it, a stipulative definition. A stipulative definition may be used to introduce a new term, or to prescribe a new meaning to a term which is already in use.
    A descriptive definition can be shown to be "right" or "wrong" by comparison to usage, but a stipulative definition cannot."

    What Tis is providing are of course stipulative definitions. Such definitions are neither right nor wrong; but they can be accepted or discarded.

    Take the definition of morality: "Morality is the system of rules and propositions correctly describing how one should and should not behave". There are several assumptions even here that are at least questionable. For example, it is not obvious that morality should be systematic. Perhaps morals ought be a matter of ad hoc decisions, rather than systematic adherence. It is not obvious that morality must consist of rules and propositions (a strange redundancy - are there rules that are not propositions?). Perhaps morality should consist of a series of attitudes: charity, mercy, forgiveness - or strength, the will to power, authority.

    But even supposing that morality consists of a system of rules, why assume that there is only one such system? Why "THE system of rules", and not "A system of rules"? Is it really possible that a single system of rules could fit all circumstances, all possible situations, all eventualities? Why rule out a priori the possibility of different strokes for different folks?

    There are other problems here, of course. And no doubt Tis will feel the desire to set me to rights on each of the points I have made. But that is not my purpose here. Rather, I want to point out how Tis' project fails from the outset. No on is obliged to accept the definitions provided; and there are profound reasons not to. What follows is wind.

    Edit: and he hasn't answered my post on the old thread...shaking head


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    Wosret
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    Posted 12/08/08 - 12:27 AM:
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    #20
    I was thinking Tisthammerw, you continue to ask the question "who or what says that X is moral". For the sake of argument I concede my position, I'm convinced, it's a whole new day! I'm ready to adhere to god's commands. So I ask you oh messenger from the heavens: X is immoral because?, and x is moral because?

    Now -- don't misconstrue -- I'm not rejecting that I ought to obey the commands, or that god is the source and foundation of morality. I am merely asking specifically why any X is immoral, why any X is moral? Perhaps I missed it, but is this also just because the commands say so?

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