Philosophy Forums


Can we be morally good without God?

PrintPrint


Page: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Can we be morally good without God?
Tisthammerw
banned

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Mar 18, 2004
Location: Minnesota

Total Topics: 7
Total Posts: 930
Posted 12/07/08 - 04:31 PM:
Subject: Can we be morally good without God?
quote post
#1
In this thread I wish to discuss the argument from morality. For a full description of my view one can click that link, but it's quicker just to read this post.

Part 1: defining my terms

In an attempt to safeguard against misconstruals, I'll define my terms from the outset.

Morality is the system of rules and propositions correctly describing how one should and should not behave (e.g. one should not steal). Objective morality is the idea that moral principles are valid, binding, and true independently of whether any of us humans think, feel, or believe them to be so. Authority is the power to impose prohibitions and obligations that ought to be obeyed. Authority includes both the power to lay down rules and to instill them with their ought-to-be-obeyed quality. Aseity (uh-SEE-it-ee) is the property of not being dependent on anything else for its existence (laws of logic are one possible example), and aseitic means "having aseity." I define God as the Being that is eternal, omnipresent, aseitic, the locus of morality and possesses infallible and supreme authority over everyone such that everyone ought to always obey Him. Regardless of whether such a Being really is the basis of morality, it is notable that this definition of God is not necessarily anthropomorphic. A human might be able to order someone to kill Jews for the purposes of ethnic cleansing, whereas the basis of morality (and therefore God) might not be able to do that. Certain aspects of God's nature could be immutable.

The answer to the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" need not be a literal mouth and voice or even necessarily anything that communicates to humanity. Rather, "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" is simply asking for the foundation of morality and the source of moral principles; i.e. the entity/thing/force that lays down these moral obligations and prohibitions. If for instance the basis of morality were mathematics such that all moral principles could be derived from some mathematical proof based solely on mathematical true-by-definition statements, then the answer is "Mathematics says how we ought to behave" and mathematics would be the authority over our behavior in this strange scenario. According to the moral argument, God is the entity that imposes moral prohibitions and duties upon humanity, thus implying the answer is "God says how we ought to behave."

Addendum: some may object to be defining "objective morality" as "the idea that moral principles are binding independently of whether humans believe them to be so" (some use different definitions in different contexts). To some extent I sympathize, but since the Standford Encyclopedia of Philospohy uses pretty much the same definition in the context of the moral argument, and because for the moment I can't think of better label for this type of morality, I've decided to use "objective morality" as the definiendum in this case. Ultimately what name you give this type of morality doesn't matter of course; this type of morality either exists or it doesn't regardless of what definiendum is attached to it.


Part 2: Without God, who or what says how we ought to behave?

The existence of God provides a clear answer to the question of "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" But what does atheism have? If moral principles are binding independently of whether we believe them to be so, who or what says how we ought to behave? My contention is that atheism has no good answer to this question.

Suppose for instance the answer to this question is "nothing." Unless one is an adherent of moral nihilism (which says there is nothing morally wrong) this encounters problems. If there is literally nothing that says how we ought to behave, then there is also nothing that says Hitler ought to have behaved differently when he decided to slaughter millions of Jews. The problem with "nothing says how we ought to behave" is that it is tantamount to saying "there are no rules of behavior." Something has to say how we ought to behave, whether it be God, mathematics or whatever. So we're back to the question at hand for the atheist. If God does not exist and moral principles are binding independently of whether we believe them to be so, who or what says how we ought to behave?


Part 3: the moral argument

Although I believe atheism has no good answer to the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" (all you atheists are free to prove me wrong) I also want to develop a positive case for God as the basis of morality.

Interestingly enough, it seems almost self-evident to both the theist and the atheistic moral objectivist that objective morality is a fundamental part of reality. In the case of classical theism, God is the fundamental reality from which all existence and moral truths originate. Atheism faces a bit of a challenge however. Since moral statements are not analytic (true by definition, e.g. "hairless men have no hair"), it's more difficult for atheism to explain why morality exists so fundamentally, because in that case what would be morality's metaphysical basis? Let X be the basis of objective morality. X does not seem to be confined to any particular time or location. If we cut out any tiny space-time segment of the universe and destroyed the rest, morality would still exist in that segment. So, the basis of morality is in some sense present at all places at all times. On the atheistic view, this X also doesn't seem to depend on anything in the universe for its existence. Morality would still exist if we took away cars, mountains, stars, and even entire galaxies. In other words, the basis of morality would be aseitic. In this sense at least (being eternal, omnipresent, and requiring an aseitic basis), morality seems to be a fundamental part of reality.

What about humans? One interesting idea is that it is the existence of humans that somehow causes moral truths to exist, and if we took away humans moral truths would not exist. Upon closer examination however this does not appear to be the case. Take for instance the necessarily true statement "all bachelors are unmarried." This claim would hold true even if there were no bachelors, because what the statement is essentially saying is, "If there was one or more bachelors, any such bachelor would be unmarried." Similarly, the moral statement "It is morally wrong for a man to torture an infant just for fun" essentially means "If there was a man and an infant, the man should not torture the infant just for fun." Would this if-statement hold true in a universe without humans? It would appear so, because if we started with a universe without humans and the if-statement wasn't true, then even if we inserted a man and an infant into this previously uninhabited universe the statement "the man should not torture the infant just for fun" would not be true. This would mean "It is morally wrong for a man to torture an infant just for fun" is true without humans in the same way that "all bachelors are unmarried" is true without bachelors. But if that is the case, then the basis of objective moral truths cannot be the existence of humans.

The basis of morality would have a number of other interesting characteristics as well. Whoever or whatever it is that says how we ought to behave, this X must possess the following attributes.

  1. Supremely transcendent authority. It is one thing to merely say what people should do, but X (the basis of objective morality) must be authoritative in that people really ought to obey it. Suppose for instance a Nazi commands a subordinate to kill Jews. Is it the case that the subordinate ought to obey the Nazi? No, the subordinate ought to obey the dictates of morality instead, because the dictates of objective morality ought to be obeyed over the orders of any human. The basis of morality must transcend the authority of other people's behavioral commands if its ought-statements are to be objectively truthful. This would include, for instance, transcending the authority of dictators who would order torture and genocide. Otherwise people ought to obey the dictator instead of morality. So the basis of objective morality not only says how we ought to behave but also does so with supremely transcendent authority (transcending e.g. Hitler's authority).
  2. Universally binding. Goes along with the nature of objective morality. X's authority must be universally binding in that it applies to everyone (e.g. all peoples in all governments) regardless of who, when, and where we are and regardless of what any human thinks, feels, and believes.
  3. Infallibly authoritative. The basis of objective morality cannot be mistaken on what is morally right (else it would not be the basis of morality when it says what is moral), so it says how we ought to behave with infallible moral authority.

So what could this X be? What are we left with as the metaphysical basis for objective morality if nothing in the universe will do? Especially if the basis of morality exists at all places at all times? At the end of the day we have a mysterious fundamental entity that just happens to be eternal, omnipresent, aseitic, the locus of morality, and commands our behavior with infallible, universally binding, and supreme authority. It is as if atheist has intuitively sensed the necessity of a God without realizing it.

Finding something that fits the description

The existence of God would provide the foundation for objective morality as the eternal sovereign entity that everyone ought to obey. The problem for the atheistic moral objectivist would be trying to find a reasonable basis for objective morality that fits the above characteristics (e.g. eternal and omnipresent while being the supreme authority in the universe) but cannot reasonably be called God. The most straightforward prospect perhaps lies in the realm of the abstract, such as logic and mathematics. Theorems of math and logic are analytic and therefore are unconfined by time and space while apparently being aseitic. Moral statements being analytic would thus solve the atheist's problem here. But because moral statements are not analytic, the challenge of finding a basis for moral truths is rather troublesome, particularly since the foundation of objective morality must be some type of eternal, omnipresent entity with infallible and supreme authority over everyone. It may be then that God is required as a transcendent anchor point for objective morality.

Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.
Tisthammerw
banned

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Mar 18, 2004
Location: Minnesota

Total Topics: 7
Total Posts: 930
Posted 12/07/08 - 04:43 PM:
Subject: Continued from
quote post
#2
Continued from "Calling all Atheists- a disbelief crisis." I mentioned in my first post to that thread that whether atheism is rational will depend on your starting points; e.g. free will, morality, and rationality. One thing led to another however, the culminating point being post #52. Post #52 (one I didn't write) of that thread said, "I don't want to hijack this thread, but..." but by the end of that post it was hijacked into the moral argument. I replied, but somebody didn't like that it led off to the moral argument, and so I'm forced to continue it here.

Kwalish Kid wrote:
Euthyphro arguments can come in a number of varieties, but a pretty common one that applies here is that if divine command theory were true than morality would be arbitrary; which is the sort I presented in post #64. This is a straw man?

You presented nothing of the sort, you buffoon.

(1) I really don't see the need for such animosity here. (2) I suggest you reread the post. I addressed very specifically the question "What about God's commands being arbitrary if He was the foundation of morality?"

Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.
Tisthammerw
banned

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Mar 18, 2004
Location: Minnesota

Total Topics: 7
Total Posts: 930
Posted 12/07/08 - 05:11 PM:
Subject: Continued from ...
quote post
#3
Continued from "Calling all Atheists- a disbelief crisis." I mentioned in my first post to that thread that whether atheism is rational will depend on your starting points; e.g. free will, morality, and rationality. One thing led to another however, the culminating point being post #52. Post #52 (one I didn't write) of that thread said, "I don't want to hijack this thread, but..." but by the end of that post it was hijacked into the moral argument. I replied, but somebody didn't like that it led off to the moral argument, and so I'm forced to continue it here.


mric wrote:
Tisthammrew wrote:
I suppose you could start by (1) Explain what question I am begging (you forgot to explain that); (2) How I'm begging it (you forget to explain that part too).

Actually, I think you're position is a bit petitio principii, particularly with the first premise. I'm granting for sake of argument that the second premise is true, but again you still haven't justified the first premise; and thus (so far) appear to be assuming it without warrant.


But I gave you a reason, and you didn't address it. If the second premise is true and it is impossible for rape not to be an ethical issue, then it necessarily follows that the basis of morality (whatever that might be) cannot be silent on whether rape is an ethical issue; the basis of morality must prohibit rape. If the basis of morality has some type of immutable nature such that it is impossible for it to not prohibit rape, why think that God cannot have that nature? You still haven't answered this question.

You deeply misunderstand the argument. I am not saying that it is impossible that God has that nature. I am saying that it is possible that he does not have that nature. That is all that is needed to skewer your position on one horn or the other of the dilemma.

You still haven't justified the first premise: that it is possible for such an entity to not have that nature.

mric wrote:
Is it possible that the omnipotent creator of the universe, to whom humans are (maybe) less than ants, gives no commandments on the subject of rape? All the argument requires is that it is a possibility.

I should point out that the definition you're using is different from the one I gave you. Sure, if you only define God as "omnipotent creator" then yes it is possible for God to be silent on the matter of rape, because it is possible that this entity is not the locus of morality (and thus would not logically be required to prohibit rape if this creator were not the basis of morality). But that's not the definition of God I'm using. Suppose we define an entity with the following attributes: the Being that is eternal, omnipresent, aseitic, the locus of morality with infallible and supreme authority over everyone such that everyone ought to always obey Him. This is the definition of God I am using. Regardless of whether such a Being really is the basis of morality, would your first premise work here? I don't think it would. It seems it would not be possible for such a Being to give no commands on the subject of rape, at least if we assume that it is impossible for the basis of morality to give no commands on the subject of rape.


mric wrote:
I will repeat it for you, and ask again whether it is premise 1 or premise 2 you reject:

1. If God were the basis of morality, then it would be possible for God to be silent on the subject of rape, and thus rape would be not an ethical issue (like, we assume, wearing a hat or blinking are not ethical issues)
2. Rape must be a matter of ethical concern
3. Therefore God is not the basis of morality

I'll paraphrase into a form that is more clearly valid (again, please correct me if I have misinterpreted you).

  1. If God were the basis of morality, then it would be possible for God to be silent on whether rape is an ethical issue, and thus it would be possible for rape not to be an ethical issue.
  2. It is impossible for rape not to be an ethical issue
  3. Therefore God is not the basis of morality.

I'll grant the second premise to be true for sake of argument (and because I suspect it's true). My objection is that you haven't justified the first premise: that it is possible for God to be silent on the subject of rape. So far we have this sort of argument.

  1. It is impossible for the basis of morality to have property P (e.g. have no say on whether rape is an ethical issue).
  2. If X was the basis of morality, it is possible for X to have P.

Statement #2 obviously cannot hold true for all Xs in reality, because some X has to be the basis of morality. I'm wondering why if we substituted God into X statement #2 would be true. There's reason to think it's not true. If the second premise is true and it is impossible for rape not to be an ethical issue, then it necessarily follows that the basis of morality (whatever that might be) cannot be silent on whether rape is an ethical issue; the basis of morality must prohibit rape. So why think it's possible that if God was the basis of morality He could be silent on the matter of rape? What's so special about God that would make statement #2 true?

Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.
Incision
Professor
Avatar

Usergroup: Administrators
Joined: Jan 04, 2008
Location: Utah

Total Topics: 23
Total Posts: 906
Posted 12/07/08 - 05:26 PM:
quote post
#4
One thing seems to be an obvious problem. "God" is defined as "the Being that is eternal, omnipresent, aseitic, the locus of morality and possesses infallible and supreme authority." But this isn't how people normally define "God": it's missing crucial attributes such as personhood, disembodiment, omnipotence, omniscience, perfect freedom and being the creator of the universe.

If we define "God" as "the special creator of each species," then given evolution we can prove that God doesn't exist. But neither of these proofs is very interesting.

I also think there is a (less serious) problem with the definition of "authority." "Power to impose prohibitions and obligations" is just the sort of rough, commonsense definition you'd get from a dictionary. Compare it to, say, "x has authority regarding y iff possibly x brings about that y has a moral status." Maybe we need some more conceptual work done before the argument will be clearly persuasive to an atheist.

But bearing this in mind, we can ask whether the argument proves that if there are objective moral truths then there is a being that is eternal, omnipresent, aseitic, etc.
180 Proof
kynic
Avatar

Usergroup: Sponsors
Joined: Apr 27, 2003
Location: NOTHINGlifeNOTHING

Total Topics: 84
Total Posts: 5135
Posted 12/07/08 - 05:40 PM:
Subject: A deistic god entails nothing within the universe (e.g. morals), therefore ...
quote post
#5
... Assuming a theistic god, can we BE -- moral or not -- without god?

Reject this assumption, however, and the rest follows. rolling eyes

Edited by 180 Proof on 12/07/08 - 10:22 PM. Reason: Deus ex metaphysica?!

The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?"

Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence.

[What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]
kNoctis
slide away boat
Avatar

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Jan 06, 2005

Total Topics: 67
Total Posts: 619
Posted 12/07/08 - 05:43 PM:
quote post
#6
I was the one who "hijacked" the thread, but someone had already proposed the moral argument to begin with, and I was merely disagreeing with it.

Tist,

You're entire argument has consisted of listing the conditions a "basic of morality" must meet, e.g. immutability, authority, etc..., defining God as meeting those conditions, and then concluding that, therefore, God exists.

For example:

1. The basis of morality must be eternal, immutable, omnipresent, and incorporeal.
2. By "The Great Snowman", I mean someone who is eternal, immutable, omnipresent, and incorporeal.
3. There must be a basis of morality.
4. So, The Great Snowman must exist.

But this is a ridiculous argument, to say the least. First, you have failed to provide any real evidence for (3), other than its falsification being undesirable. A world such as that would be a consequence of finding no basis in morality, but it doesn't mean there must be one. Why should people prefer the existence of God over moral nihilism?

I'm also not the slightest bit convinced that the basis of morality must meet some of your conditions - such as eternalness, immutability, and especially "omnipresence". It is simply unclear what you mean to say that it "exists everywhere and at all times". If it is incorporeal in some way, its location in space cannot be a descriptive category, unless you mean it metaphorically. Even then, I have no idea what the metaphor could mean, since I have no experience with understanding incorporeal things. Furthermore, morality only exists in reference to moral agents, so I don't understand why it must be eternal. Finally, in regards to its immutability, actions can't be morally evaluated in isolation to the particular times and circumstances in which they present themselves. Was it wrong for an average man in the 1200's to own a slave? You could say it was, but given his social climate and cultural norms, could you expect him to do otherwise?

And ultimately, the most important question, and the one you haven't even bothered trying to answer: why is it necessary that God exists? You've provided a case that something must be a basis of morality, and that this something must have certain characteristics. I've already explained my objections to those two premises, and now I will explain my objection to your conclusion. According to your argument, it isn't necessary that God exists. It's necessary that something which contains the necessary characteristics that the basis of morality must have exists, but there is a big difference.

The number one difference is that God is commonly ascribed a personality, and I don't see how the basis of morality must have a personality. In fact, it's this commonly attributed quality of being "personal" that actually creates the conflict inherent in the Euthyhphro dilemma. Unfortunately for you, you can't simply remove this conflict by redefining objective morality as being independent of human belief alone. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy may have one way of looking at it, but a 2500 year old philosophical problem isn't solved by merely defining a phrase in a peculiar way.

Edited by kNoctis on 12/07/08 - 05:51 PM
Tisthammerw
banned

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Mar 18, 2004
Location: Minnesota

Total Topics: 7
Total Posts: 930
Posted 12/07/08 - 06:27 PM:
quote post
#7
kNoctis wrote:
I was the one who "hijacked" the thread, but someone had already proposed the moral argument to begin with, and I was merely disagreeing with it.

I didn't actually present the moral argument until later. I just noted (in response to a question someone-not-me asked as to whether I thought the Holocaust would be morally wrong without God) "Without God, I just don't see a viable 'something' that would provide a foundation for morality." To be fair, there's probably a lot of blame to go around, including me when I said whether atheism is rational depends on your starting points, and specifically mentioned free will, morality and rationality (though did not make any arguments for God from them in that post).


kNoctis wrote:
Tist,

You're entire argument has consisted of listing the conditions a "basic of morality" must meet, e.g. immutability, authority, etc..., defining God as meeting those conditions, and then concluding that, therefore, God exists.

For example:

1. The basis of morality must be eternal, immutable, omnipresent, and incorporeal.
2. By "The Great Snowman", I mean someone who is eternal, immutable, omnipresent, and incorporeal.
3. There must be a basis of morality.
4. So, The Great Snowman must exist.

But this is a ridiculous argument, to say the least.

You bet; you forgot to add that the Great Snowman must also have aseity, be the locus of morality, and have infallible and supreme authority over everyone. grin

Suppose you're right: I only defined God as a Being with characteristics I believed the basis of morality must have. My response in a nutshell: so what? Can we not reasonably call this eternal and omnipresent sovereign entity God?


kNoctis wrote:
First, you have failed to provide any real evidence for (3), other than its falsification being undesirable. A world such as that would be a consequence of finding no basis in morality, but it doesn't mean there must be one.

Remember my key question: who or what says how we ought to behave? Suppose for instance the answer to this question is "nothing." Unless one is an adherent of moral nihilism (which says there is nothing morally wrong) this encounters problems. If there is literally nothing that says how we ought to behave, then there is also nothing that says Hitler ought to have behaved differently when he decided to slaughter millions of Jews. The problem with "nothing says how we ought to behave" is that it is tantamount to saying "there are no rules of behavior." Something has to say how we ought to behave, whether it be God, mathematics or whatever. But if that is true, this "something" is what morality's foundation is.


kNoctis wrote:
I'm also not the slightest bit convinced that the basis of morality must meet some of your conditions - such as eternalness, immutability, and especially "omnipresence". It is simply unclear what you mean to say that it "exists everywhere and at all times". If it is incorporeal in some way, its location in space cannot be a descriptive category, unless you mean it metaphorically.

God is classically an incorporeal entity, yet He is said to be eternal and omnipresent. I don't think this is necessarily unreasonable, because it could be true in a more nonphysical sense. More abstractly, the truth of "2 + 2 = 4" exists in all places in all times; there is no place or time where it doesn't hold true.


kNoctis wrote:
Furthermore, morality only exists in reference to moral agents, so I don't understand why it must be eternal.

I kind of answered that in my original posts. Cut out any tiny space-time segment of the universe and destroy the rest; would the moral statement "one should not torture infants just for fun" still be true in that segment? It would appear so. It would appear to be true at all times in the universe's existence. What about moral agents? If we remove moral agents (e.g. humans), would moral truths cease to exist? I don't think it would, and here's why.

Take for instance the necessarily true statement "all bachelors are unmarried." This claim would hold true even if there were no bachelors, because what the statement is essentially saying is, "If there was one or more bachelors, any such bachelor would be unmarried." Similarly, the moral statement "It is morally wrong for a man to torture an infant just for fun" essentially means "If there was a man and an infant, the man should not torture the infant just for fun." Would this if-statement hold true in a universe without humans? It would appear so, because if we started with a universe without humans and the if-statement wasn't true, then even if we inserted a man and an infant into this previously uninhabited universe the statement "the man should not torture the infant just for fun" would not be true. This would mean "It is morally wrong for a man to torture an infant just for fun" is true without humans in the same way that "all bachelors are unmarried" is true without bachelors. But if that is the case, then the basis of objective moral truths cannot be the existence of humans.


kNoctis wrote:
Finally, in regards to its immutability, actions can't be morally evaluated in isolation to the particular times and circumstances in which they present themselves. Was it wrong for an average man in the 1200's to own a slave? You could say it was, but given his social climate and cultural norms, could you expect him to do otherwise?

Perhaps not, but that has no relevance as to whether slavery was morally wrong.


kNoctis wrote:
And ultimately, the most important question, and the one you haven't even bothered trying to answer: why is it necessary that God exists? You've provided a case that something must be a basis of morality, and that this something must have certain characteristics. I've already explained my objections to those two premises, and now I will explain my objection to your conclusion. According to your argument, it isn't necessary that God exists. It's necessary that something which contains the necessary characteristics that the basis of morality must have exists, but there is a big difference.

(1) Atheism has no good answer to the question of "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" If this is true, the existence of God is required for morality to exist. (2) If all else fails, I suppose I could weaken my claim and just say that objective morality provides evidence for God's existence.


kNoctis wrote:
The number one difference is that God is commonly ascribed a personality, and I don't see how the basis of morality must have a personality. In fact, it's this commonly attributed quality of being "personal" that actually creates the conflict inherent in the Euthyhphro dilemma.

Why? Modern forms of the Euthyhphro dilemma argue that if God were the basis of morality, then morality would be arbitrary in the sense that God could have commanded anything, even rape, and rape would become ethical. Presumably, rape cannot possibly ethical, and therefore God isn't the basis of morality. But there's a problem. If rape cannot possibly ethical, then it cannot be possible for the basis of morality (whatever that might be) to command rape. We would have to reason that the basis of morality has some type of immutable nature such that it could not command rape. But why think that God cannot have that nature? So far, I haven't seen an explanation for that.

Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.
Tisthammerw
banned

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Mar 18, 2004
Location: Minnesota

Total Topics: 7
Total Posts: 930
Posted 12/07/08 - 06:36 PM:
quote post
#8
Incision wrote:
One thing seems to be an obvious problem. "God" is defined as "the Being that is eternal, omnipresent, aseitic, the locus of morality and possesses infallible and supreme authority." But this isn't how people normally define "God": it's missing crucial attributes such as personhood, disembodiment, omnipotence, omniscience, perfect freedom and being the creator of the universe.

This is a good point I think, but consider. Suppose everyone converts to atheism and believes the universe is infinitely old. But then it turns out we find an eternal and omnipresent Being who has aseity, is the locus of morality, and is the infallible and supreme authority in the universe that everyone ought to obey. Can we not reasonably call this eternal and omnipresent sovereign entity God?


Incision wrote:
I also think there is a (less serious) problem with the definition of "authority." "Power to impose prohibitions and obligations" is just the sort of rough, commonsense definition you'd get from a dictionary.

In my defense, I gave a few more specifics. Authority includes both the power to lay down rules and to instill them with their ought-to-be-obeyed quality. Having supreme moral authority would thus imply the power to make moral ought-statements true.


Incision wrote:
But bearing this in mind, we can ask whether the argument proves that if there are objective moral truths then there is a being that is eternal, omnipresent, aseitic, etc.

I supported this with the help of various thought experiments. What do you think? Do the thought experiments yield the results I claimed them (e.g. cut out any tiny space-time segment of the universe...)?

Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.
makerowner
Assistant Professor

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Apr 15, 2008

Total Topics: 11
Total Posts: 326
Posted 12/07/08 - 08:07 PM:
quote post
#9
This is a perfect example of why metaphysics and morals shouldn't mix.

The answer to the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" need not be a literal mouth and voice or even necessarily anything that communicates to humanity. Rather, "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" is simply asking for the foundation of morality and the source of moral principles; i.e. the entity/thing/force that lays down these moral obligations and prohibitions.


That brings up the epistemological question of how we come to know these moral principles, and how we should find out which ones are founded. "Surely some revelation is at hand"...but which one? Or maybe you'd like to posit some sort of "moral sense", but that would bring up the question of why the principles this "sense" discovers seem to vary by culture. People raised by cannibals tend to think cannibalism is good, others don't. Who's following the founded principles?

The problem with "nothing says how we ought to behave" is that it is tantamount to saying "there are no rules of behavior." Something has to say how we ought to behave, whether it be God, mathematics or whatever.


Why can't that something be us? Your whole argument rests on the assumption of "objective morality", with nary an argument in sight for it. If we say that behaviour is 'good' because people think it's good, then we have no need for a deus ex metaphysica.

Since moral statements are not analytic (true by definition, e.g. "hairless men have no hair")


There are plenty of problems with the term 'analytic', but I see even more with your use of the term 'moral statement'. What is a moral statement? Is any statement with the predicate "is right" or "is wrong" a moral statement? Clearly that won't work, since those terms can also mean 'correct' and 'incorrect', or 'suitable' and 'unsuitable'.

Eh, I've had enough of this. I'll just recommend you Putnam's (very short) book Ethics Without Ontology.

For philosophy, Socrates, if pursued in moderation and at the proper age, is an elegant accomplishment, but too much philosophy is the ruin of human life. Even if a man has good parts, still, if he carries philosophy into later life, he is necessarily ignorant of all those things which a gentleman and a person of honour ought to know.
Kwalish Kid
Tenured Poster
Avatar

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Sep 26, 2004

Total Topics: 33
Total Posts: 3844
Posted 12/07/08 - 08:08 PM:
quote post
#10
Tisthammerw wrote:
In this thread I wish to discuss the argument from morality. For a full description of my view one can click that link, but it's quicker just to read this post.

And thank goodness. Hopefully this nonsense will be sequestered here and not pollute other threads. It really is a sickness and should be viewed with the hostility it deserves. This is a particularly poorly reasoned and poorly presented version of a really, really bad argument.

The argument, as one should be able to see, is a presentation of Divine Command theory. Despite protestations of the author, protestations of Lady Macbeth character, the theory is nothing more that Divine Command and can be seen as such as the author continues to stick to the language of authority despite the many criticisms on this score.
Part 2: Without God, who or what says how we ought to behave?

The existence of God provides a clear answer to the question of "Who or what says how we ought to behave?"

It would be nice to think that this is the case. God defined as in this thread is fine, because it is the grounds for authority by definition. Yet this is not a definition given by all religions. Indeed, simply stating that God is the source of all morality is not an answer, since there is no actual reason provided that such a being should exist or that any being could exist in some relationship to morality. So, yes, the definition of God does provide an answer, but not an answer that has any positive reason for providing belief.
But what does atheism have?

Of course, the question should be what does anyone who does not share this bizarre definition of God have? It seems that very, very few people are actually moral.
Suppose for instance the answer to this question is "nothing." Unless one is an adherent of moral nihilism (which says there is nothing morally wrong) this encounters problems. If there is literally nothing that says how we ought to behave, then there is also nothing that says Hitler ought to have behaved differently when he decided to slaughter millions of Jews.

Again, here the author actually asks for a recourse to some commander, someone to state that a certain act is good or bad. And, of course, like any bad rhetorician these days, makes an emotional appeal to the Holocaust.

There is a significant difference between, "There is no being that makes statements about how one should behave," and, "There is no basis for morality." There is also a big difference between, "There is no being that makes statements about how one should behave," and, "There is a being that, in some unknown way, makes moral statements true."
So we're back to the question at hand for the atheist. If God does not exist and moral principles are binding independently of whether we believe them to be so, who or what says how we ought to behave?

So we're left with, unsurprisingly, the argument from ignorance. The author cannot think of (and actively ignores) arguments for a basis for morality that do not involve the very bizarre definition of God he provides. Given the vast amount of literature on this topic, this wilful ignorance places the author in the position of either one of two conditions. The first condition is that of being so incompetent as to be beneath consideration. The second condition is that of being completely dishonest and using rhetoric in order to draw in those who have difficulty following an argument.
Interestingly enough, it seems almost self-evident to both the theist and the atheistic moral objectivist that objective morality is a fundamental part of reality. In the case of classical theism, God is the fundamental reality from which all existence and moral truths originate. Atheism faces a bit of a challenge however. Since moral statements are not analytic (true by definition, e.g. "hairless men have no hair"), it's more difficult for atheism to explain why morality exists so fundamentally, because in that case what would be morality's metaphysical basis? Let X be the basis of objective morality. X does not seem to be confined to any particular time or location. If we cut out any tiny space-time segment of the universe and destroyed the rest, morality would still exist in that segment.

Again an argument from ignorance. Many theorists claim that the basis for morality is very confined to a particular time and location because without sentient or feeling beings, there is no morality of any kind.
So, the basis of morality is in some sense present at all places at all times. On the atheistic view, this X also doesn't seem to depend on anything in the universe for its existence.

Again, as many, many theists and atheists have written, morality does seem to depend on the existence of beings with certain mental qualities.
Morality would still exist if we took away cars, mountains, stars, and even entire galaxies. In other words, the basis of morality would be aseitic. In this sense at least (being eternal, omnipresent, and requiring an aseitic basis), morality seems to be a fundamental part of reality.

This passage is yet another argument from ignorance, as the list provided is in no means exhaustive.
What about humans? One interesting idea is that it is the existence of humans that somehow causes moral truths to exist, and if we took away humans moral truths would not exist. Upon closer examination however this does not appear to be the case. Take for instance the necessarily true statement "all bachelors are unmarried." This claim would hold true even if there were no bachelors, because what the statement is essentially saying is, "If there was one or more bachelors, any such bachelor would be unmarried." Similarly, the moral statement "It is morally wrong for a man to torture an infant just for fun" essentially means "If there was a man and an infant, the man should not torture the infant just for fun." Would this if-statement hold true in a universe without humans? It would appear so, because if we started with a universe without humans and the if-statement wasn't true, then even if we inserted a man and an infant into this previously uninhabited universe the statement "the man should not torture the infant just for fun" would not be true. This would mean "It is morally wrong for a man to torture an infant just for fun" is true without humans in the same way that "all bachelors are unmarried" is true without bachelors. But if that is the case, then the basis of objective moral truths cannot be the existence of humans.

There is an obvious problem with this argument: the author asks us to believe that counterfactual hypothetical statements that involve humans do not involve an understanding of what a human being is. For if we did understand what makes it wrong for an adult to torture an infant, this would, for the moral theorists the author discusses, involve an understanding of the nature of human beings. Such an understanding could remain based on human nature even if there were no humans, just like Sherlock Holmes scholarship is based on the nature of Sherlock Holmes. Even though the author seems to recognize that moral statements are not analytic, he seems unable to think of any other sort of statements that can be true regardless of the actual facts.
The basis of morality would have a number of other interesting characteristics as well. Whoever or whatever it is that says how we ought to behave, this X must possess the following attributes.

  • Supremely transcendent authority. It is one thing to merely say what people should do, but X (the basis of objective morality) must be authoritative in that people really ought to obey it. Suppose for instance a Nazi commands a subordinate to kill Jews. Is it the case that the subordinate ought to obey the Nazi? No, the subordinate ought to obey the dictates of morality instead, because the dictates of objective morality ought to be obeyed over the orders of any human. The basis of morality must transcend the authority of other people's behavioral commands if its ought-statements are to be objectively truthful. This would include, for instance, transcending the authority of dictators who would order torture and genocide. Otherwise people ought to obey the dictator instead of morality. So the basis of objective morality not only says how we ought to behave but also does so with supremely transcendent authority (transcending e.g. Hitler's authority).

  • Again the author retreats to command theory rather than actually consider some other sort of statements. Note that there is no reason for the author to say that it is wrong for people to obey a dictator. The author can provide no actual moral statements that follow from his definition, so people following a dictator cannot be taken to be a counter-example to moral theory.
  • Universally binding. Goes along with the nature of objective morality. X's authority must be universally binding in that it applies to everyone (e.g. all peoples in all governments) regardless of who, when, and where we are and regardless of what any human thinks, feels, and believes.

  • Again, there is no reason to suppose that this is a requirement. The author has provided no reason to believe that the source of morality cannot be the source for very specific commands that differ from individual to individual.
  • Infallibly authoritative. The basis of objective morality cannot be mistaken on what is morally right (else it would not be the basis of morality when it says what is moral), so it says how we ought to behave with infallible moral authority.

  • This brings us to the standard problem of all divine command theories. There is no reason, except for the trivial one, to say that the source of morality is actually moral. The being could be entirely without thought and would still be, technically, infallible.
    So what could this X be? What are we left with as the metaphysical basis for objective morality if nothing in the universe will do? Especially if the basis of morality exists at all places at all times? At the end of the day we have a mysterious fundamental entity that just happens to be eternal, omnipresent, aseitic, the locus of morality, and commands our behavior with infallible, universally binding, and supreme authority. It is as if atheist has intuitively sensed the necessity of a God without realizing it.

    Again note the recourse to command theory. The author hopes that the recourse to command will promote a belief in a thinking being that considers morality. However, thinking is not necessary for an unexplanable basis for morality and it is impossible that any consideration done by the being will be moral consideration, since there is no standard by which the being can be judged.
    The existence of God would provide the foundation for objective morality as the eternal sovereign entity that everyone ought to obey. The problem for the atheistic moral objectivist would be trying to find a reasonable basis for objective morality that fits the above characteristics (e.g. eternal and omnipresent while being the supreme authority in the universe) but cannot reasonably be called God.

    Of course, the atheist and theist could more correctly reject the abysmally poor arguments above and simply move on with being moral.
    The most straightforward prospect perhaps lies in the realm of the abstract, such as logic and mathematics. Theorems of math and logic are analytic and therefore are unconfined by time and space while apparently being aseitic.

    One should perhaps step in here and mention Kant and his descendants who promote the idea that mathematical propositions are synthetic a priori.
    Moral statements being analytic would thus solve the atheist's problem here. But because moral statements are not analytic, the challenge of finding a basis for moral truths is rather troublesome, particularly since the foundation of objective morality must be some type of eternal, omnipresent entity with infallible and supreme authority over everyone. It may be then that God is required as a transcendent anchor point for objective morality.

    Note that the author cannot see past the idea that there may be a basis for morality, but that this basis is not an entity.

    "Scientific truth is always paradox, if judged by everyday experience, which catches only the delusive nature of things." - KM, V, P and P

    Can you pass Religion 101?
    Download thread as

    Page: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8



    Sorry, you don't have permission to post. Log in, or register if you haven't yet.