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meaning and reality

HamishMacSporran
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Posted 03/29/05 - 04:22 AM:	#71
cuthbert wrote: So, suppose someone defines "real" as meaning something other than real - for example, suppose they define it to mean "two-legged". They may correctly classify anything that does in fact meet their given criteria as "real": so humans would be "real", as defined, and dogs would not. But it does not follow that humans are real and dogs are not. In the same way as above, we can't just decide whether something is real by calling it so. Earlier I posted this: HamishMacSporran wrote: Consider these situations: 1)two witnesses have just seen an accident and are describing what happened to a policeman. A: The car was on the pavement when suddenly ... B: No, the car wasnt on the pavement! A: Yeah, it was! B then realises that A is american and is using pavement to describe the road surface (rather than the path alongside the road, which A would call a sidewalk). In fact the disagreemant between A and B simply boils down to the way they are choosing to use the term 'pavement'. 2)two biology students are arguing over the classification of the Morganucodontids: A: They are mammals! B: Dont be ridiculous, they fit into neither the monotreme nor therian branches, so obviously cant be mammals. A: Dont give me that cladistic garbage. A and B then realise they are simply using the term mammal in different ways. For A and B the term mammal describes a different set of features. 3)Two physicists are arguing over the many worlds interpretation. A: When we talk of many worlds, its just a construct used in building a model of whats going on. B: No! They are real. How else are we to determine whats real, other than what is described by our best theories? A: Can you see one of these other worlds? Can you go there? Of course not! How can you call them real? Can A and B decide they are simply disagreeing over how to use the term 'real'? It certainly seems to me that we can redefine 'real'. As you said we could redefine it to mean 'two legged'. It also seems to me that we could, if we chose to, describe the "many worlds" of quantum physics as 'real'. After all, how we use a word is entirely up to us. We could also, it seems, choose not to describe the "many worlds" as 'real'. Does this mean that 'reality' comes down to the way we choose to use language?

Gassendi1
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Posted 03/29/05 - 05:58 AM:	#72
HamishMacSporran wrote: So, is it conceivable that others, using different criteria from our own, may use the term 'real' in a significantly different way, without mistake? That is, is there a meaning of 'real' which is objectively correct? Or, do we have a choice about how we define 'real'? (Yes, you should be able to edit posts. There should be a little paper and pencil icon at the top of each post you make. Click to edit) The word "real" like the word (as long as we are talking about adjectives) is a term in English. All terms in English (or any other natural language) have fixed meanings. Why should the term "real" be any different? Some time ago, it may have been on this thread, I excerpted for you several passages from J.L Austin on the meaning of "real". I thought it was quite an accurate explication of it. You didn't make any objection to it, You ignored it. And yet, you now recycle the question. It seems to me that if your question is serious, then you ought to consider serious answers to it instead of simply going on an unorganized speculation about the matter. It is not up to a particular individual speaker of the language what a particular word means. The meaning of a word occurs because of a community of agreement among speakers of the language. So, it seems to make sense that in order to discover what "real" of any other term in the language means, the wrong way of going about it is to consult your untutored intuition about it. Individuals often have all sorts of cockeyed view about what words mean. This is amply illustrated by a number of the Platonic-Socratic dialogues which Aristotle characterized as "a search for definition". One thing that constantly emerges from those dialogues, or, indeed, any discussion about the meaning of words is that there is a far cry between knowing the meaing of a word, and knowing wht the word means. A person, a fluent speaker of a language, may use a term quite correctly when he speaks or when he writes, but may engage in a preposterous attempt to explain the meaning of a word which he is able to use with no trouble at all. That is why lexicographers reseach the meanings of words they intend to enter into their dictionary by doing field work among native speakers, and recording how native speakers use the word. But they never, never, ask a native speaker to theorize about the meaning of a word, which is beyond the native speaker's competence.

HamishMacSporran
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Posted 03/29/05 - 08:38 AM:	#73
Gassendi1 wrote: The word "real" like the word (as long as we are talking about adjectives) is a term in English. All terms in English (or any other natural language) have fixed meanings. Why should the term "real" be any different? garbage Not only do languages change (sometimes remarkably quickly), but there are individual variations from speaker to speaker, even individual speakers usages vary depending on the circumstance. The idea that words have fixed meanings is laughable, and anyway irrelevant. I didnt ask whether we should change the meaning of 'real', or whether it was actually changing, or whether it might change sometime in the future. What I asked was whether in principle (as opposed to whether there are actually any variations in practice) disagreements about what is real might come down simply to disagreements about how to use the word 'real'. A says: The extra dimensions described by modern quantum physics are real, they are just undetectable. B replies: Of course they arent real, they are just a mathematical device to make the equations work. How can something be real and undetectable? Can this be construed as a disagreement about the meaning of the word 'real'? I did read the Austin. It was interesting but did not directly address my question. The idea that 'real' has a well defined, fixed, unchallengeable meaning that brooks no disagreement about what it should and should not be applied to is just errant nonsense. Edited by HamishMacSporran on 03/29/05 - 09:06 AM

Cuthbert
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Posted 03/30/05 - 04:44 AM:	#74
HamishMacSporran wrote: A says: The extra dimensions described by modern quantum physics are real, they are just undetectable. B replies: Of course they arent real, they are just a mathematical device to make the equations work. How can something be real and undetectable? Can this be construed as a disagreement about the meaning of the word 'real'? To me it seems like this: - A and B agree about the meaning of the word 'real' but they disagree about whether the extra dimensions described by modern quantum mechanics are real. B's use of "Of course" suggests a degree of outrage, and this is not because he believes A does not understand what 'real' means. B believes that A understands perfectly well what 'real' means and he is outraged that A nevertheless claims that something is real which according to B is obviously not real. So it's a disagreement not about the meaning of a word but about whether extra dimensions are real or not. A's opening statement looks as if he is making a contrast between real extra dimensions and something else, but he doesn't say what the 'something else' is. It could be, e.g., extra dimensions mistakenly supposed to exist by earlier quantum physics, in contrast with the real ones now correctly identified by modern quantum physics. Sometimes a constant used by an economist in a predictive model has no other function than to make the model work better. The economist might say: 'This variable represents consumer demand, this one represents dollar/yen exchange rate, etc. and this is a constant that doesn't represent anything real, it just makes the model work and gives us better predictions.' That is an example where 'real' is a useful word, to contrast one element in an equation from another. But from A's statement, I don't know what contrast he is making. If I knew that, then I might be able to clear the whole matter up. Another possible interpretation is this: - A believes it is possible for something to exist that is not detectable, whilst B believes either that if something exists then it must be detectable or that whatever happens to exist happens also to be detectable. On this interpretation, the outcome will hinge on whether A can give an example of an undetectable thing that nevertheless exists, or whether B can produce a reason for thinking that such a thing either cannot or does not happen to exist. On this interpretation, A and B are not arguing about the meaning of the word 'real' or the word 'exists', but about whether it is possible for something to exist that is not detectable. Actually, they have not started to argue about that question: they have just stated opposing beliefs and neither has yet offered an argument. I can't wring any more interpretations out of this short exchange. Edited by Cuthbert on 03/30/05 - 06:18 AM. Reason: terminology corrected

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Posted 03/30/05 - 11:48 PM:	#75
OK, this is my next take on this fascinating subject: - (1) How we use the word 'pavement' (or 'real', or any word) is a matter of agreement or stipulation. (2) Having resolved any misunderstandings arising from (1) the question of whether a pedestrian was or was not on the pavement does not come down to the definition of 'pavement'. It comes down to whether or not he was on the pavement. The matter of definition has been resolved, and it is now a matter of fact. Similarly, the question of whether something is real or not is no longer a matter of the definition of 'real' but of whether it is real. (3) It is reasonable to use 'pavement' to mean either 'road' or 'sidewalk' in various contexts. It will depend upon whether I am speaking American-English or UK-English. We will only be able to agree the matter of fact - whether the pedestrian was on the pavement - when we have sorted out any misunderstandings of definitions. But we must not confuse a misunderstanding of a definition with a dispute about a matter of fact. (4) It is not reasonable to use 'real' to mean anything other than real. Or, if there are any good reasons for doing so, I have not encountered them. There are, however, bad reasons for wanting to use 'real' to mean something other than real: one common bad reason is to persuade another person that something exists when it does not. (5) There are often very good reasons for judging one kind of classification system superior to another. Fish/mammal is much more useful than ichthus/zoon, for obvious reasons. The kind of arguments in favour of a particular classification system are quite different from the arguments for classifying a particular specimen within a given system. (6) There are very good reasons for judging one kind of ontological classification system better than another. Almost the worst kind of ontological classification system I can imagine is one that has two categories, 'existing' and 'not-existing' (or 'real' and 'not-real'), such that in the 'existing' category there are some things that exist and some that do not, and similarly in the 'not-existing' category. Someone who says 'Reality comes down to how I choose to use the word "real"' is at least half way to suggesting such a system. The two disputants in Hamish's 'other-worlds' example, who 'agree to disagree' over their definition of 'real', have subscribed to this system and are unlikely to get anywhere in the rest of their discussion.

HamishMacSporran
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Posted 03/31/05 - 04:29 AM:	#76
Cuthbert wrote: To me it seems like this: - A and B agree about the meaning of the word 'real' but they disagree about whether the extra dimensions described by modern quantum mechanics are real. B's use of "Of course" suggests a degree of outrage, and this is not because he believes A does not understand what 'real' means. B believes that A understands perfectly well what 'real' means and he is outraged that A nevertheless claims that something is real which according to B is obviously not real. So it's a disagreement not about the meaning of a word but about whether extra dimensions are real or not. I agree that this is certainly one interpretation. I definitley do not want to claim that all disagreements come down to disagreements about the meaning of words. This is no less true for 'real'. Suppose two disputants (both agreeing what they mean by 'king arthur' and 'real') have an argument about whether or not king arthur was a real person. Such a dispute is about a matter of fact, rather than about how to define the terms used. Cuthbert wrote: A's opening statement looks as if he is making a contrast between real extra dimensions and something else, but he doesn't say what the 'something else' is. It could be, e.g., extra dimensions mistakenly supposed to exist by earlier quantum physics, in contrast with the real ones now correctly identified by modern quantum physics. Actually, I just made up this dialogue for illustration. Dont read too much into it. Cuthbert wrote: Sometimes a constant used by an economist in a predictive model has no other function than to make the model work better. The economist might say: 'This variable represents consumer demand, this one represents dollar/yen exchange rate, etc. and this is a constant that doesn't represent anything real, it just makes the model work and gives us better predictions.' All our ideas about the world can be thought of as arising as parameters in a model which we use to understand what is going on 'out there'. For instance, your conception of 'HamishMacSporran' is part of a model you use in understanding the text that appears in these posts. We could say that some X is 'real' is to claim that the part of the model corresponding to X has a counterpart 'out there'. Or something like that, I dont want to pretend that giving a definition of 'real' is simple or uncontroversial. However, how do we know whether the X in our model has a 'real' counterpart? We can only do so by carrying out certain observations and inferences. It is certainly possible for two different people to disagree about the procedures to be used for identifying what is real and what is not. We might even take the view that the meaning of 'real' (that is, its usage) is captured by these procedures, rather than by a relation to some objective world 'out there' (whether or not there is one). Cuthbert wrote: That is an example where 'real' is a useful word, to contrast one element in an equation from another. But from A's statement, I don't know what contrast he is making. If I knew that, then I might be able to clear the whole matter up. In the case of quantum physics, it is usually accepted that the results of experiments are 'real'. And everything else is in dispute. Cuthbert wrote: Another possible interpretation is this: - A believes it is possible for something to exist that is not detectable, whilst B believes either that if something exists then it must be detectable or that whatever happens to exist happens also to be detectable. On this interpretation, the outcome will hinge on whether A can give an example of an undetectable thing that nevertheless exists, or whether B can produce a reason for thinking that such a thing either cannot or does not happen to exist. Couldnt the claim that whatever exists is detectable be construed as part of a definition of 'exists'. We could in fact try to define existence in terms of being detectable (although this would not be without problems). Alternatively, we might exclude such a stipulation from our definition of 'exist'. In this case it would be possible to claim that undetectable things exist. Suppose someone does claim that undetectable matter exists. That there is a type of matter which does not interact and so is undetectable. To claim that such matter is 'real' seems to me a contradiction in terms. I am not sure whether this is a mistake on my part, an intuition about the nature of reality or a pragmatic choice about how to use the word 'real'. Cuthbert wrote: On this interpretation, A and B are not arguing about the meaning of the word 'real' or the word 'exists', but about whether it is possible for something to exist that is not detectable. Actually, they have not started to argue about that question: they have just stated opposing beliefs and neither has yet offered an argument. Thats correct. I dont think there are any arguments as to whether undetectable things can exist. I think it comes down to how you choose to use exist. Certainly we do have such a choice. It would seem to me that the most sensible choice would be to use 'exist' and 'real' in such a way that they do not apply to anything undetectable. But the best way to use these words is not my main enquiry, which is to decide if we really do have a choice about how we use these words, and to analyse what implications this has. I think it is clear that 'exist' and 'real' do have meanings and usages. Are these based on agreement by the language users? If so, then it seems clear that there are alternative usages. Whether or not there are any actual disagreements about the usage of 'real', these alternative usages suggest that what constitutes reality is itself based on agreement by language users. If the meaning of 'real' is not based on agreement, that is there is only one possible meaning, how is this determined? Edited by HamishMacSporran on 03/31/05 - 07:47 AM

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Posted 03/31/05 - 07:44 AM:	#77
HamishMacSporran wrote: But the best way to use these words is not my main enquiry, which is to decide if we really do have a choice about how we use these words, and to analyse what implications this has. Then I think I've got the answer. Yes, you really do have a choice about how you use these words ('real' and 'exists'). The main implication is that if you choose to use them in a way that means something 'real' is nevertheless not real, or something that 'exists' nevertheless does not exist, then you will cause confusion of a most spookily enjoyable kind. If, on the other hand, you choose to limit the use of these words so that only what exists 'exists', then life may be a little duller but communication will improve. This was the main point of my last post #75. HamishMacSporran wrote: In the case of quantum physics, it is usually accepted that the results of experiments are 'real'. And everything else is in dispute. Now we're getting somewhere. A and B are agreeing about the results of the experiments and they are arguing about how to interpret the results. So the results are real and the interpretation in terms of extra-dimensions either is or isn't real. Fine, but it would be much clearer just to say that the results are known, but their interpretation is disputed; or that we all agree about the observations, but we are not yet agreed on a theory to explain the observations. Unfortunately - or fortunately perhaps - you don't get a philosophical problem out of those clearer formulations. HamishMacSporran wrote: It is certainly possible for two different people to disagree about the procedures to be used for identifying what is real and what is not. We might even take the view that the meaning of 'real' (that is, its usage) is captured by these procedures, rather than by a relation to some objective world 'out there' (whether or not there is one). Yes, two people may disagree about the procedures to verify whether X exists. But now think about how they might settle their disagreement. They would decide which procedure is the most effective as a method for verifying the existence of X. But if 'the existence of X' means the procedure used to identify X, then they have no basis on which to evaluate the procedures or to settle their disagreement. They might as well use any procedure because it is the procedure itself that constitutes that which the procedure is trying to identify. I agree that the ability to state the method for verifying a hypothesis is an excellent indicator of whether the hypothesis has a clear meaning. But it is often a poor way of explaining what that meaning is, and still less does it constitute that meaning. HamishMacSporran wrote: Couldnt the claim that whatever exists is detectable be construed as part of a definition of 'exists'. It is certainly possible to claim that undetectable things exist. Suppose someone does claim that undetectable matter exists. That there is a type of matter which does not interact and so is undetectable. To claim that such matter is 'real' seems to me a contradiction in terms. I would rather wait and see how he backs up his claim than jump in too early and accuse him of self-contradiction. 'X exists' and 'X is [in principle] detectable' certainly strike me as having a close logical relation, but your argument is too condensed to show that it is one of necessity.

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Posted 04/01/05 - 01:23 PM:	#78
Cuthbert wrote: Then I think I've got the answer. Yes, you really do have a choice about how you use these words ('real' and 'exists'). The main implication is that if you choose to use them in a way that means something 'real' is nevertheless not real, or something that 'exists' nevertheless does not exist, then you will cause confusion of a most spookily enjoyable kind. Two questions: 1) Would there necessarily be any confusion? Would language users even notice? If, for example, it turned out that the result of some experiment seemed to de evidence of the detection of something that was not 'real' then this would certainly be confusing. But this would be taken care of by getting a consistent defintion of 'real'. 2) What could it mean for something which fits the definition of 'real' not to be real? However we define 'real' that is what it is. Cuthbert wrote: If, on the other hand, you choose to limit the use of these words so that only what exists 'exists', then life may be a little duller but communication will improve. This was the main point of my last post #75. Again, I would question whther language users would actually notice any improvement in communication. In information theory, communication occurs when I transmit a message to you which carries some quantity of information. In this mathematical formalism, information is measured in terms of ability to make predictions about the environment. Whether or not you accept this definition of information, it would seem to be the case that communication has to be evaluated in relation to what is actually measurable. Language users will only notice an improvement in their ability to communicate if this relates to actually measurable properties. In this way communication is dependent on what is measurable, rather than what objectively exists or what is real. Cuthbert wrote: Now we're getting somewhere. A and B are agreeing about the results of the experiments and they are arguing about how to interpret the results. So the results are real and the interpretation in terms of extra-dimensions either is or isn't real. Fine, but it would be much clearer just to say that the results are known, but their interpretation is disputed; or that we all agree about the observations, but we are not yet agreed on a theory to explain the observations. Unfortunately - or fortunately perhaps - you don't get a philosophical problem out of those clearer formulations. I agree that you have avoided the philosophical problem, but I didnt claim that the problem was unavoidable. I didnt claim that any disagreement about what was 'real' and what was not had to come down to a disagreement about the meaning of 'real'. I merely asked whether it was possible. The problem returns if I introduce a third character, C, who says "Fellas you're just arguing over the meaning of terms. You've just got different conceptions of the term 'real'. Why argue over definitions?" Can what C says be true? It certainly seems that B might then reply "How can this idiot, A, not know that 'real' means the thing is detectable.?" It certainly seems that A and B might have different usages of 'real'. And if they do, is deciding which definition to use found by agreement among the language users, or is there a 'correct' usage? Cuthbert wrote: Yes, two people may disagree about the procedures to verify whether X exists. But now think about how they might settle their disagreement. They would decide which procedure is the most effective as a method for verifying the existence of X. But if 'the existence of X' means the procedure used to identify X, then they have no basis on which to evaluate the procedures or to settle their disagreement. They might as well use any procedure because it is the procedure itself that constitutes that which the procedure is trying to identify. Yes, thats a good point. However, is there an alternative? Can they evalutes their usage of 'real' against some gold standard? Can they actually know what is real without using these procedures? No, they cant. However they choose to define 'the existence of X', there will have to be some procedure for evaluating whether X exists. This might involve empirical or rational processes. What is not possible is that reality is apprehended directly without such a procedure. So, these procedures inevitably get measured against themselves. The best we can hope for is that the procedures are consistent, in themselves and with other definitions. We cant escape the problem you identify, as there is no way to measure these procedures against reality directly. Note, I am not arguing that we ought to define 'real' in terms of any particular procedure, such as detectability. I am just trying to produce plausible definitions for 'real' as examples for discussion. If 'real' gets its meaning by agreement among language users, then there ought to be such alternative definitions. If there is only one possible definition of 'real' then no such agreement would be involved in arriving at a definition. If there are alternative usages, then it would seem that there are alternative conceptions of what is real. Whether or not there are any actual disagreements about the usage of 'real', these alternative usages suggest that what constitutes reality is itself based on agreement by language users. Cuthbert wrote: I agree that the ability to state the method for verifying a hypothesis is an excellent indicator of whether the hypothesis has a clear meaning. But it is often a poor way of explaining what that meaning is, and still less does it constitute that meaning. Yes. This is a weak point in my position. I am treating meaning as being based in usage. I am including the procedures used to decide whther a usage is correct as being part of the usage. There are obvious difficulties with conflating meaning with procedures for verification. However, I am equally suspicious of a reference theory of meaning, which seems to suppose that meaning is based on 'noetic rays' which connect word and referent.

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Posted 04/01/05 - 01:23 PM:	#79
Consider this comment from Thomas Nagel: "The seductive appeal of objective reality depends on a mistake. It is not the given. Sometimes the truth is not found by traveling as far away from one's personal perspective as possible."

HamishMacSporran
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Posted 04/03/05 - 11:46 AM:	#80
As another example of a plausible definition of what it means to exist, heres W.V.O Quine: To be is to be the value of a bound variable.

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